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China on the Fast Track
1992 was a banner year for the Chinese economy.
With relatively little world media attention, China
achieved a spectacular 12.8 percent output growth
rate and laid the ground for an ambitious eco-
nomic reform program. These achievements were
especially notable in view ofthe general doldrums
in the world economy and the immense difficul-
ties encountered by the formerly socialist econo-
mies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Impressed by this outstanding perform-
ance, some observers predict that China will be a
world economic superpower in the next century.
This Letter reviews China's rapid growth and
rededication to economic reform in 1992 and as-
sesses both the short-run and the long-run pros-
pects of its economy. In brief, while the outlook
is generally optimistic, China also faces some
major challenges. China's successful takeoff to
sustainable economic growth into the next cen-
tury will depend critically on whether it will be
able to overcome existing structural weaknesses
in its economy.
Flying high
China's strong economic performance in 1992
was broad-based. Real agricultural output rose
4 percent, and the grain harvest was the second
highest on record. Industrial output rose 20 per-
cent, on top of a 14 percent increase in 1991.
Most remarkable was the phenomenal 60 percent
output growth of rural and township industries,
which in 1992 employed a total of 100 million
workers and accounted for about 17 percent of
the nation's total labor force. Foreign trade also
grew rapidly: Exports rose by 18 percent and
imports increased by 27 percent. Attracted by a
booming economy and availability of low-cost
labor and land, foreign direct investment reached
$11 billion, more than double the volume in 1991.
In addition, amidst this rapid expansion inflation
remained moderate: Retail prices increased
5.3 percent, up from 4.0 percentthe year before.
The boom in 1992 was an acceleration of recov-
ery from a prolonged recession in 1989-1990.
The recession was brought on by a severe aus-
terity program launched in September 1988 in
order to fight inflation. The program was remark-
ably successful in achieving its goal: The retail
price inflation rate fell from 27 percent in 1988 to
6 percent in 1989 and to near zero in the second
half of 1990. In 1991, the authorities cautiously
eased up controls; the economy responded
quickly, with outputrising 7 percent, upfrom 4 and
5 percent in 1989 and 1990. Then in 1992, the
authorities pulled out all the stops: Investment
expenditures rose a whopping 33 percent, while
the broad money (M2) growth rate reached an
8-year high of 30 percent. Under these strong
stimuli, outputgrowth accelerated to 12.8 percent,
second only to the historical high of 14.6 percent
in 1984.
Economic reform
1992 is also notable because it marks the start of
the third stage of China's economic reform-the
first two began in 1979 and 1984, respectively.
The year opened with a clarion call by Deng
Xiaoping to accelerate the pace of economic
reform. In his celebrated "Speech after the South-
ern Tour," Deng strongly berated the "obstruc-
tionists" who wished to cling to the old system,
and called for bold, across-the-board economic
reform in order to let market forces playa greater
role in a "socialist economy with Chinese char-
acteristics." The speech signaled a major change
in the direction of the country's economic policy.
Between 1989 and 1991, reform was put on hold
in the name of combatting inflation. Since the
only policy instrument available to the authorities
for fighting inflation was direct controls through
the old planning framework, the seat of power in
policymaking shifted markedly back to the cen-
tral planning authorities. In that environment,
planning control was king, and mere talk of eco-
nomic reform was taboo.
Deng's speech changed all that. Immediately
after the speech, a carefully orchestrated nation-
wide movement was launched to study the speech,
and senior officials and researchers were directed
to prepare a comprehensive program for the im-
plementation of the ideas it contained. Suddenly,
the atmosphere changed. Reform came back intoFABSF
vogue, and officials at all levels and in all regions
began pushing for reform.
Some interpret this abrupt change as another
demonstration of Deng's powerful leadership
in China. Without disputing the obvious, it also
may be interpreted as an inevitable response to
mounting political pressure from local govern-
ment authorities. As most of the Chinese econ-
omy languished under the stringent spending
controls during 1989-1990, certain regions in the
south-Guangdong Province and three Special
Economic Zones along its coast-experienced
rapid growth and prosperity. The difference was
that local authorities in these regions had special
latitude to accommodate both foreign and do-
mestic investors, and they seemingly invested
and extended credit as much as they saw fit. In
any case, some attribute this special latitude to
local officials' connections with Beijing; it is just
as plausible, however, to assume that it reflected
the central authorities' recognition of the region's
special role in attracting much needed capital
and technology from Taiwan and neighboring
Hong Kong. The result was that the rapid eco-
nomic growth and prosperity in these regions
turned into a giant magnet for a large and rising
volume of capital and skilled labor from the rest
of the country. It appears likely that clamors from
the local authorities in the rest of the country to
share in the same rapid growth and prosperity
enjoyed by the southern regions prompted the
central authorities to lift tight spending controls
and institute nationwide economic reforms.
Indeed, one of the first policy changes was to
grant local authorities across the country permis-
sion to establish "special development zones"
with a virtually free hand to offer incentives for
attracting domestic or foreign capital to develop
local industries. The local authorities wasted no
time seizing this opportunity. The number of
such zones jumped from 117 at the end of 1991 to
more than 2,000 at the end of1992. Conceivably,
a substantial portion of the 33 percent increase
in investment expenditures in 1992 was due to
the local governments and the businesses they
established.
In the meantime, a comprehensive reform pro-
gram was drawn up by the State Commission on
Restructuring the Economic System. The program
was approved and promuIgated bythe State Coun-
cil in March this year. As promised, the program
was truly bold,aimed at clearing away nearly all
the remnants of the old economic structure that
continue to impede the working of market forces,
in areas ranging from state enterprises, price
controls, commodity markets, foreign trade, in-
vestment restrictions, government budget and
revenue sharing, banking and financial markets,
wages, unemployment insurance, housing, and
medical care. Reports from China indicate that
parts of the program have already been imple-
mented, such as laying off idle workers in a few
state enterprises.
Near-term prospects
The near-term prospects of China's economic
growth depend crucially on the authorities' as-
sessment of the risk of inflation currently in the
economy. Over the past year, a debate has been
raging in China over whether the economy has
become "overheated:' Those who are not con-
cerned argue that the rapid growth in 1992 was a
natural acceleration of a rebound from the 1989-
1990 recession, that the high money and invest-
ment growth was to meet pent-up demand, and
that in fact the inflation rate measured by retail
prices was quite moderate. Those who are con-
cerned point to the more than 11 percent rise in
the cost of living index for residents of 35 major
cities, the 13 percent rise in the prices of capital
goods, and wit-hin that index the 16 percent rise
of electric machinery prices and the 18 percent
rise in cement prices. In addition, they claim, the
nation's transportation capacities were already
severely strained, meeting only 60 percent of
demand. They fear that sooner rather than later
the strains felt in the production sectors in 1992
will spillover to affect consumer prices this year.
Recently released data indicate that rapid growth
continued into the first quarter of 1993, with out-
put at a level 14 percent higher than the same pe-
riod last year, industrial output 22 percent higher,
investment by state enterprises an astounding
70 percent higher, and that by local governments
80 percent higher. At the same time, signs of ac-
celerating inflation have appeared. Retail prices
in major cities were 15 percent higher, and those
in the countryside more than 8 percent higher,
than last year. The $1.2 billion trade surplus dur-
ing the first quarter of 1992 turned into a $1.2 bil-
lion deficit this year.
Under these conditions, actions reportedly have
already been taken to restrain inflation: Orders
have gone out to banks over the country not to
exceed allocated credit limits, and many invest-
ment projects have been canceled or postponed.
If these measures are carried out, an explosive
boom-and-bust might be avoided. One would
then expect a significant slowdown of output
growth from its rapid pace last year, to perhaps8 percent as in the official forecast. However, in
view of the signs of inflationary pressures that
have already surfaced, retail prices are likely to
rise more than 10 percent for the year, rather than
the 6 percent envisaged in the official forecast.
Long-term prospects
During the decade of the 1980s, China achieved
a remarkably high average growth rate of 9 per-
cent a year. The achievement was attributable
to the economic reform since 1979, which has
released abundant productive initiative, talents,
and energy to seek opportunities for an improved
standard of living. Given the nation's renewed
commitment to economic reform, its high savings
rate, its large pool of underutilized labor, its low
level of technology, and the wide areas of struc-
tural adjustments yet to be explored, there is
every reason to be optimistic about China's
long-run growth prospects.
This optimism, however, is predicated on the
nation's long-term commitment to economic
reform and on the soundness of the reform pro-
gram. Although economic reform has benefited
the vast majority of the people, commitment to
reform is a political decision. In every reform
there are always winners and losers, and there is
no guarantee that the will of the minority losers
would not dominate over that ofthe majority
winners-especially in a country like China,
where the direction of political winds is partic-
ularly hard to predict.
As to the soundness of the reform program, since
only its broad outline was made public recently,
it is obviously premature to attempt any serious
assessment. Nevertheless, from the scope and
general thrust of the announced program one
does gain an impression of a readiness to depart
from the piecemeal approach to reform in the
past and replace it with a systems approach that
takes into consideration the interlocking relation-
ships of the various parts of the reform program.
For instance, the perennially loss-making state
enterprises have been a millstone that has
weighed down government finance and at the
same time obstructed reform of the financial sys-
tem; reform of the inefficient state enterprises in
turn has been impeded by not having a "safety
net" to provide housing, medical care and other
types of adjustment assistance to workers laid off
from these enterprises; and yet to provide this
safety net wouldrequire funding which the gov-
ernment can ill afford, given the poor state of its
finance. Whether the newly announced com-
prehensive reform program can break this grid-
lock remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Reform of centrally planned economies is un-
charted territory. Using a piecemeal, experi-
mental approach since 1979, China has attained
remarkable success in casting off many of the
shackles that had deprived its people of the fruits
of modern economic growth, as enjoyed by the
peoples of the industrial countries and the newly
industrialized economies in the Pacific Basin
region. China's growth performance since reform
began, and especially in 1992, has been impres-
sive. In theshort run, its ability to achieve sus-
tained rapid growth will depend on its success
in defusing the current threat of inflation without
another recession. In the long run, despite reform,
the shackles that remain continue to restrain the
nation from exploiting its full growth potential.
The authorities in China appear to have recog-
nized the limitations of the piecemeal approach
and now have adopted a bold and broad reform
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